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DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC. V. BYRD: THE UNRAVELING OF
THE INTERTWINING DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
The seeds of the "intertwining doctrine"I are found in the Supreme
Court's 1953 decision of Wilko v. Swan.2 Wilko held that the Securities
Act of 19333 rendered unenforceable agreements to arbitrate future4
federal securities law claims arising out of disputes between investors
and broker-dealers, despite conflicting provisions in the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.5 While the holding in Wilko clearly directed that "a federal
court has the sole right to decide the ultimate issues essential to a fed-
eral securities law claim,"' 6 it gave no indication of the viability of an
arbitration provision on pendent 7 state securities or common law claims.
Frequently, the pertinent facts underlying these pendent state and com-
mon law claims are "inextricably intertwined" with the federal securities
law question. The Supreme Court recently examined the propriety of
the intertwining doctrine, which allowed a federal court to try both the
arbitrable state or common law claims and the non-arbitrable federal
securities law claims together, despite the existence of a valid arbitration
1. Also known as the "permeation doctrine" (Lee v. Ply*Gem Industries, Inc., 593
F.2d 1266, 1274 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979)). This doctrine may be de-
fined as "a judicially-created exception to the application of the Arbitration Act which
instructs that when arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims are sufficiently intertwined factu-
ally and legally, a court should deny arbitration of the arbitrable claims and try all the
claims together in federal court." Liskey v. Oppenheimer, 717 F.2d 314, 317 (6th Cir.
1983) (citations omitted).
2. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
3. Securities Act of 1933, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
4. Agreements to settle or arbitrate claims arising from violations which have already
occurred are not void under sections 14 and 29(a). See, Murtagh v. University Captial
Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974); Coenen v.
R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 406 U.S. 949
(1972); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1013 (1971); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir.
1968). See generally Gruenbaum, Avoiding The Protection Of The Federal Securities Laws: The
Anti-Waiver Provisions, 20 SANTA CLAA L. REv. 49, 55 (1980); Note, Enforceability of Arbitra-
tion Agreements In Fraud Actions Under the Securities Act, 62 YALE L.J. 985, 994-96 (1953).
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
6. Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643-44 (7th Cir. 1981).
7. Pendent jurisdiction is defined in BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1021 (5th ed. 1979)
as: "Original jurisdiction resting under federal claim extends to any nonfederal claim
against same defendant if the federal question is substantial and the federal and
nonfederal claims constitute a single cause of action." For a more complete discussion of
the doctrine, see, e.g., Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and PendentJurisdic-
tion, 33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 759 (1972); Minahan, Pendent and AncillaryJurisdiction of United States
Federal District Courts, 10 CREIGHrON L. REv. 279 (1976); Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal
Courts: A Reviised Rationalefor PendentJurisdiction, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 245 (1980); Note, UMW
v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L. REV. 657 (1968); Note, Federal Pendent Party
Jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs - Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L.
REV. 194 (1976); see also Maasar, A Pendent and Ancillay Jurisdiction Primer: The Scope and
Limits of SupplementalJurisdiction, 17 U.C.D. L. REV. 103 (1983).
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agreement.8 In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,9 the Court determined
that the pendent state claims must be severed from the federal securities
claims and submitted to arbitration. This article will trace the evolution
of the conflict regarding the intertwining doctrine, analyze and discuss
the arguments presented to the Supreme Court in Byrd, and highlight
the questions left unresolved by this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Although arbitration probably "predates our traditional judicial sys-
tem, and, in some respects, is the philosophical and procedural father of
civil litigation,"' 1 it was viewed with hostility by the English common
law courts as an infringement on their jurisdiction. " The House Report
accompanying the Arbitration Act recognized this problem stating:
The need for the law arises from . . . the jealousy of the
English courts for their own jurisdiction. . . . This jealousy
survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly
embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it
by the Americn courts. The courts have felt that the precedent
was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative en-
actment .... 12
The Arbitration Act plainly evinces a congressional preference for
arbitration as a means of dispute resolution and this preference is codi-
fied in the unambiguous language of section 2 of the Act, which man-
dates that contractual arbitration agreements "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable," unless the contract itself is invalid.' 3 Ar-
8. The intertwining doctrine had been recognized by the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits. See Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 1238 (1985); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (11 th
Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981). The Sixth, Sev-
enth, and Eighth Circuit Courts have rejected the intertwining doctrine. See Surman v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984); Liskey v. Oppen-
heimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983); Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661
F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
9. Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
1238 (1985).
10. Lippman, Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Settlement: Some Selected Perspectives, 24
ME. L. REv. 215, 216 (1972). Arbitration is defined by Lippman as "the submission of a
dispute, controversy or claim to a person or persons, usually unofficial, who have been
selected in a manner provided by agreement or law." Id. at 215 (citations omitted). S.
EAGER, THE AxarrRAlON CoNTRAcr AND PROCEEDINGS § 1 (1971) defines arbitration as "a
proceeding whereby, pursuant to the agreement of parties, disputes or controversies be-
tween them, without regard to the justifiable nature thereof, are submitted by them for
determination by an individual or individuals rather than by a court or judge acting in a
judicial capacity." The Arbitration Act contains no definition of arbitration.
11. See M. DoME, COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION § 301 (1968). See generally S. EAGER,
supra note 10; F. ELKOURI & E. EItOURI, How ARBrRATION WORKS 2-4 (3d ed. 1973);
Sturges, Arbitration-What Is It? 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1031 (1960).
12. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1-2 (1924).
13. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (emphasis added) Section 2 of the Arbitration Act directs:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
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bitration is perceived as an efficient method of avoiding the unnecces-
sary expense and delay of litigation,14 as illustrated by section 3 of the
Act, 15 which directs that, after initially determining that the request for
arbitration is governed by the agreement, the court action shall be
stayed pending resolution of the dispute by arbitration. In addition, the
court may order the arbitration to proceed in accordance with the agree-
ment, appointing an arbitrator itself, if the parties cannot agree on
one.
1 6
The procedure for enforcement of arbitration agreements is very
simple, reducing technicality and formality to a minimum. The arbitra-
tion proceeding is commenced by service of notice of an application for
stay (of judicial proceedings), or an order, comparable to a summons;
five days' notice is required. Thereafter, except in cases where the exist-
ence and applicability of the arbitration agreement are in dispute, the
question of whether arbitration should be ordered is decided summarily
by motion, with affidavits and exhibits submitted to avoid the necessity
of a court appearance by the parties or their witnesses. Upon determi-
nation by the court that the arbitration agreement is valid and applicable
to the disputed issues, the court enters an order directing that arbitra-
tion on the merits of the controversy proceed.
After the arbitrator renders his or her decision, either party may
apply to the court specified in the petition for an order confirming the
award; if no court was specified, application would be made to the fed-
eral court in the district where the award was rendered. This award
must be granted as a matter of course, unless the award is later judicially
vacated, modified or corrected. 17 The grounds for vacating, modifying
or correcting an award are limited, and the motion must be made within
three months. If the award was obtained by corruption, fraud or undue
influence; if there was evidence of partiality or corruption by the arbitra-
tor; if the arbitrator was guilty of misbehavior or misconduct; or if the
arbitrator exceeded his powers or failed to make a mutual, final or defi-
nite award; then and then only may the court vacate the award.'
8 If
there was an evident miscalculation or mistake in description contained
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing con-
troversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrev-
ocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
14. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1. 3 (1924).
15. Section 3 of the Arbitration Act requires:
If any suit be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the
court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall
on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitra-
tion has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
16. Arbitration Act §§ 4-5, 9 U.S.C. §§ 4-5 (1982). See generally Cohen & Dayton, The
New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1965).
17. Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13 (1982).
18. Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
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in the award, or if the award was made upon a matter not submitted, or
if it was deficient in form, without affecting the merits, then and only
then may it be modified or corrected to effect the intent of the award
and to promote justice. 19 Upon vacating an award, the court may direct
a rehearing, if the time within which the award was to be made has not
expired.
20
Although it would appear that the Arbitration Act applies in all situ-
ations where a valid arbitration agreement exists, various "public pol-
icy" exceptions 2 1 have been recognized since the statute was originally
enacted. 2 2 Disputes involving the Securities Act of 193328 and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 193424 constitute just such an exception.
B. Case Law: Attempts to Integrate the Arbitration and the Securites Acts
The Supreme Court first addressed the conflict between the policies
and mandates of the Federal Arbitration Act and the Securities Acts in
Wilko v. Swan.25 The Court considered whether a pre-dispute agree-
ment to arbitrate is a "condition, stipulation, or provision binding any
person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision"
of the Securities Act, which section 14 of the Securities Act of 193326
declares void. Wilko sued his brokerage firm under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933,27 alleging that his stock purchases were induced
19. Arbitration Act § 11, 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1982). For circumstances in which arbitral
finality may be challenged, see, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Gas
Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); Torrington v. Metal Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.
1966); Moss, The Fate of Arbitration in the Supreme Court: An Examination, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
369, 384; Note, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 120, 146 (1977);
Note, Judicial Deference To Arbitral Determination: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23
UCLA L. REv. 936 (1976).
20. Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
21. See Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements To Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy
Denfence, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 481 (1981); see also S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v.
Utah International, 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (claims alleging violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968
(1982), not arbitrable on public policy grounds).
22. President Calvin Collidge signed the Arbitration Act of February 12, 1925, ch.
213, § 1, 43 Star. 883, effective January 1, 1926. Title 9 was codified and enacted into
positive law by the Act ofJuly 30, 1947, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 669. Sections 1 through 5 of
the Act of 1925 are identical to the 1947 statute, except that the latter adopted the catch
lines which precede each section in Title 9 of the United States Code.
23. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982). Cf Byrd, 105 S.
Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring), where Justice White notes that section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 actions, being implied rights of action, do not necessarily fall under the protection
of the 1934 Act.
25. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
26. Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provi-
sion of this title or of the rules and regulations of the commission shall be void."
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d
(1982) imposes civil liability on any person who offers or sells a security in violation of
section 5 of the Act (prohibitions relating to use of interstate commerce and the mails
unless a registration statement has been filed or is in effect) or by means of a prospectus or
oral communication which includes an untrue statement of, or omits to state a material
fact. A purchaser who knows of the untruth or omission in the prospectus or oral commu-
nication at the time he purchases is expressly precluded from recovering. The seller has
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by misrepresentations and omissions made by the brokerage firm. With-
out answering the complaint, 2 8 the defendant brokerage firm moved to
stay the trial of the action and to arbitrate the claims, relying on the
margin agreement the customer had signed. The district court held that
the agreement to arbitrate deprived Wilko of the advantageous court
remedies2 9 afforded by the Securities Act, and denied the stay. 30 The
Second Circuit reversed the trial court, s but on appeal the Supreme
Court ratified the trial court's reasoning.3 2 It analyzed the contrasting
standards under both the Arbitration Act and the Securities Act of 1933
and found that securities law violations require "subjective findings of
the purpose and knowledge" 33 or intent of an alleged violator, while the
Arbitration Act "contains no provision for judicial determination"
3 4 of
these important subjective matters. The Court concluded that Congress
must have intended that the non-waiver provision of section 14 of the
Securities Act of 1933 take precedence over the conflicting directives of
the burden of proving lack of scienter, and the amount recoverable by an aggrieved
pruchaser is expressly limited.
28. The filing of an answer by the defendant broker-dealer is deemed a waiver of the
arbitration agreement. See Hansen v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 408 So. 2d 658 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see also Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d
1023 (11 th Cir. 1982) (waiver of arbitration not lightly inferred; inferences that right to
arbitrate waived due to slight delay or apparently futile nonpursuit of arbitration will not
be made).
29. Among the "advantageous court remedies" afforded by the Securities Act of 1933
is the fact that:
Section 12(2) created a special right to recover for misrepresentation which dif-
fers substantially from the common-law action in that the seller is made to assume
the burden of proving the lack of scienter. The Act's special right is enforceable
in any court of competent jurisdiction - federal or state - and removal from a state
court is prohibited. If suit be brought in a federal court, the purchaser has a wide
choice of venue, the privilege of nationwide service of process and the jurisdic-
tional $3,000 [now $10,000] requirement of diversity cases is inapplicable.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 431 (footnotes omitted). The provisions of the Securities Acts
dealing with jurisdiction and service of process are section 22 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)(1982), and section 27 of the Secuities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1982). There is no jurisdictional requirement as to the amount in controversy to
invoke jurisdiction under either Act.
30. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir.),
rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). An interesting point is raised by the author of Note, supra note
4, at 990-91 n. 24:
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals in Wilko appears to have consid-
ered the possiblity that a claim for fraud under the Securities Act might not be a
dispute arising under the contract. The arbitration clause is not literally the 'all
future disputes' type but covers '[a]ny controversy arising between us under this
contract' which purports to cover 'all . . . relations and dealings' between the
parties. Hence, it might have been argued that fraud was not contemplated. If
the court had so found, it could not have stayed the litigation. (citations omitted).
31. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
32. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
33. 346 U.S. at 435.
34. Id. at 437. This rationale has been criticized by one commentator, who notes that
"the possibility that an arbitrator will misapply the law is present in every arbitration pro-
ceeding.. . [but] [s]o long as both the arbitrators and the underlying law are working to
achieve justice between the parties, the risk of error is not, and should not be, particularly
disturbing. Arbitration has been recognized as an acceptable mechanism for the resolu-
tion of disputes despite the risks of errors of law, and no persuasive reason has been ad-
vanced for treating differently the possibility of legal error in securities law cases." Sterk,
supra note 21, at 516 (citations omitted).
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the Arbitration Act,3 5 effectively nullifying the contractual agreement to
arbitrate.
The next examination of the controversy over the arbitration of se-
curities claims by the Supreme Court was Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 3 6 In
this case, the issue was presented in the context of an international com-
mercial transaction involving the sale of three business entities through
the purchase of securities, and involved alleged violations of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 of the Regulations
of the Securities and Exchange Commission.3 7 Balancing the possible
harm to international trade against the protective intent of the securities
laws, the Court determined that the arbitration agreement should be en-
forced and the dispute arbitrated.3 8 The Court distinguished Wilko, not-
ing that the fact that the agreement was international was a "crucial
difference" 3 9 and restricted its holding to arbitration agreements in situ-
ations with significant international contacts. 40
Subsequently, the issue of whether non-international claims arising
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are subject to the Wilko doctrine was
answered in the affirmative. 4 1 The Third,4 2 Fifth43 and Seventh 4 4 Cir-
cuits held that despite the judicial creation of a Rule lOb-5 cause of ac-
35. 346 U.S. at 438. One commentator has stated that, since nearly 10 years had
elapsed between the passage of the Arbitration Act in 1925 and the Securities Acts in 1933
and 1934, the provisions of the Securities Acts should be strictly applied when they con-
flict with the Arbitration Act; Congress was aware of the Arbitration Act and could have
made mention of it in the Securities Acts, but chose not to. See Gruenbaum, supra note 4,
at 59; see also Stansbury & Klein, The Arbitration ofInvestor-Broker Disputes, 35 ARB. J. 31, 34-
35 (1980). (Congress accepted the Wilko doctrine, and made specific reference to it when
it amended the Securities Exchange Act in 1975.).
36. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
37. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1982), section 10(b), and Rule lOb-5
of the Regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 10(b) prohibits
the use of any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. Rule lOb-5 makes unlawful the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange in connection with the purchase or sale of any security to defraud or
make any untrue statement of a material fact, or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made (considering the circumstances under which they were
made) not misleading.
38. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-17.
39. Id. at 515.
40. Id. at 519.
41. Cf. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244-45 (White, J. concurring). Because both section 10(b)
and Rule l0b-5 causes of action are implied, Justice White first notes that the literal lan-
guage of section 29 of the 1934 Act, which prohibits any stipulation, condition or provi-
sion requiring waiver of "compliance with any provision of this chapter" does not apply to
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions. In further discussions, he then states that the "spe-
cial right" to a judicial determination protected by the Wilko doctrine "is not necessarily
appropriate where the cause of action is judicially implied and not so different from the
common law action." The applicability of the Wilko exception to section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 actions was not at issue in Byrd, however, and the majority specifically declined to
resolve this question.
42. Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
43. Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824
(1977).
44. Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th
Cir. 1977).
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tion, policy considerations mandating protection of the individual
investor justified this seeming extension of the Wilko exception.
4 5
The controversy concerning the viability of the intertwining doc-
trine itself in securities cases began in 1965 with Stockwell v. Reynolds &
Co.4 6 The plaintiffs alleged violations of section 10(b), Rule lOb-5 and
alleged fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, claiming they
would have sold their stock sooner, and at a higher price but for the
fraudulent representations of the defendants. Finding that the plaintiffs'
complaint did state a cause of action, 4 7 the court held that the plaintiffs'
common law counts were subject to arbitration according to the arbitra-
tion provision of the Customer Agreements. 48 The court stayed arbitra-
tion pending a final determination of the federal claims, observing that
the relief sought in the common law counts was based on the same
transactions as the feceral securities counts. 49 The court stated that:
[t]here would appear to be little purpose in having both the
court proceeding and the arbitration going on at the same time,
and doubtless the ultimate determination by the court of [the
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims] would have a definite
bearing on the outcome of the arbitration proceeding.
50
No authority was cited for this proposition.
Shapiro v. Jaslow5 ' is another early case involving both federal secur-
ities and common law claims.5 2 The plaintiffs originally agreed to arbi-
trate the entire claim; this dispute arose when the plaintiffs decided
instead to litigate the matter. The defendant brokerage firm answered
that the plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate all controversies, including
those based on common law wrongs, and moved to stay the litigation
pending arbitration. 53 Recognizing its power to compel arbitration of
45. Cf Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (WhiteJ, concurring) (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1974)) (A "colorable argument" can be made that Wilko v.
Swan should not apply to arbitration ofjudicially implied causes of action under the 1934
Act.).
46. 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
47. Id. at 219.
48. Id. at 220.
49. The first and fourth counts charged the defendants - Reynolds & Co., the broker-
age firm and Carpenter, a partner in the brokerage firm and a director in the corporation
whose stock formed the basis of this action - with violations of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5. The second and third counts charge common law fraud and common law negligence;
the fifth count charges Carpenter with breach of his fiduciary duty as a director. Id. at 217.
50. Id. at 220.
51. 320 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
52. The court notes only that the cause of action against the brokerage firm alleged
that it had failed to act "in accordance with the laws of the United States of America and
the rules of the New York Stock Exchange." Id. at 599.
53. The plaintiffs' claims included one count against the brokerage firm and two
against another defendant (Jaslow), whose capacity in this dispute is unclear. When it filed
its answer, essentially asserting the arbitration clause as an affirmative defense, the defend-
ant brokerage firm also counter-claimed against the plaintiffs and the other defendant,
based on an alleged deficiency in one of the firm's accounts, demanding arbitration. Plain-
tiffs cross-moved to stay the arbitration of the counterclaim. The brokerage firm moved
for leave to file an amended counter-claim against the plaintiffs, deleting them from its
motion to compel arbitration. Finally, defendant Jaslow cross-claimed against the broker-
age firm.
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state securities and common law claims, the court stated that "...
under the circumstances here such procedure is impractical, if not im-
possible, since we cannot separate out the common law from the federal
law issues. [The brokerage firm] cannot render meaningless our exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the Federal Secuities Act claim by compelling arbi-
tration of an ancillary pendent dispute."'5 4 Again, no support was cited
for this statement.
The leading case advocating the application of the intertwining doc-
trine is Miley v. Oppenheimer & Company, Inc.55 While conceding that
plaintiff's section 10(b) claim was not arbitrable, the brokerage firm as-
serted on appeal that the pendent state claims for breach of fiduciary
duty and violations of the state deceptive trade practices statute should
have been severed from the federal securities claim and submitted to
arbitration, and the litigation stayed pending completion of the arbitra-
tion.56 The appeals court in effect balanced the potential that state se-
curities claims which are based upon allegations similar to those
supporting federal securities claims would never be arbitrated, with
Wilko's directive that federal courts must determine the "ultimate facts"
underlying a federal securities claim and denied arbitration of the state
claims to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities
claim. 57 The court stated that "arbitration should not be ordered where
'[a]n arbitrator making a decision on the common law claims would [be]
compelled to review the same facts needed to establish the plaintiff's
securities law claim.' ",58 In dictum, the court postulated that a much
stronger argument could be made for arbitration of pendent state claims
if the arbitration was stayed pending resolution of the litigation, instead
of staying the litigation and allowing the arbitration to go forward, as
the defendants here had suggested.
59
Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc.60 is the principal case illustrating
the perceived weaknesses and inappropriateness of the intertwining
doctrine. Relying on the sanctity of the contract containing the arbitra-
tion clause and a literal interpretation of the Arbitration Act, the Sev-
enth Circuit rejected the investor's attempt to avoid arbitration of the
common law tort and contract claims pendent to his federal securities
claim under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The Miley court's argument
that preservation of exclusive federal jurisdiction justified the applica-
tion of the intertwining doctrine in Miley was rejected as unconvincing.
The Seventh Circuit Court believed the better solution in cases with fac-
tually and legally related arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims was to stay
the arbitration proceeding pending resolution of the litigation.
6 1 It
54. Id. at 600.
55. 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
56. Id. at 334.
57. Id. at 335-36.
58. Id. at 335 (quoting Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976)).
59. 637 F.2d at 336 and n.15. Oppenheimer had moved to dismiss the federal claim
or, alternatively, to stay the federal trial until completion of the arbitration.
60. 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
61. Id. at 643-44.
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noted that under the Miley approach, "the intertwining doctrine would
always threaten to become the exception that swallowed the rule, al-
lowing the presence of a non-arbitrable claim to force a trial on other-
wise arbitrable claims." '6 2 The court also rejected the plaintiffs
argument that arbitration would cause inefficiency because of duplicated
efforts in bifurcated proceedings.63 Dickinson's last justification for liti-
gating only the federal securities claims was that this comports with the
language contained in the contract between the parties-the arbitration
clause in the Customer Agreement. The standard arbitration clause re-
quires arbitration of "all controversies '"64 which may arise between the
parties. However, if the "actual, unambiguous language" 65 of this
clause was strictly construed, as this court seemingly requires, the fed-
eral securities claims would also have to be arbitrated, a result contrary
to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Wilko.
And so the stage was set for Byrd, who filed his suit against Dean
Witter in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California, a district which had not previously ruled on the intertwining
doctrine. Byrd alleged violations of sections 10(b), 15 and 20 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193466 and four other claims based on viola-
tions of state law. The federal court exercised jurisdiction over the state
claims based on diversity of citizenship 67 and pendent jurisdiction. 68
Dean Witter moved to sever and arbitrate the pendent state claims and
stay the arbitration, pending adjudication of the Securities Act of 1934
claims based on the arbitration provision in the Customer Agreement
6 9
and the Miley court's suggested solution to the threat purportedly posed
otherwise to the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction. 70 The district
court denied the motion in its entirety and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
order on an interlocutory appeal. 7 1 The Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts' denial of the motion to compel arbitration and ordered the
severance and arbitration of the state claims to proceed contemporane-
ously with the litigation of the federal securities claims. 72 The remain-
der of this article will discuss the issues raised by the Byrd decision. The
next section outlines some difficulties which the Supreme Court's most
recent attempt at reconciling the Securities Acts and the Arbitration Act
has failed to answer.
62. Id. at 645-46.
63. Id. See supra note 15 for the text of § 3.
64. In the past, the investor routinely signed a Customer Agreement stating that
"[any controversy between us or arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration." For a discussion of recent changes in this stan-
dard agreement mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c2-2 (1984), see also infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
65. 661 F.2d at 642-43.




70. Id. at 1241.
71. 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
72. 105 S. Ct. at 1244.
19851
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 & 4
II. PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY ARBITRATION OF PENDENT STATE AND
COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. State Law Repercussions
Quite frequently, the aggrieved investor alleging federal securities
law violations will also assert common law fraud claims7 3 and state law
claims for breach of fiduciary duty74 and breach of contract and dam-
ages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 7 5 Potentially these
state law claims allow for recovery of punitive damages 76 which are not
available for federal securities law violations. 77 The doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction permitted the federal courts recognizing the intertwining
doctrine7 8 to decide matters not specifically enumerated in any statutory
grant of federal jurisdiction, such as state securities and common law
claims, including punitive damages. 79 As a result of the Byrd decision,
the presence of an enforceable arbitration clause effectively precludes
punitive damage awards. Judgments in federal securities claims are lim-
ited to awards of actual damages, and the arbitration of all other inves-
tor disputes is based on a contract, i.e., the Customer Agreement, which
typically covers "any controversy arising between us under this con-
tract." Therefore, unless awards of punitive damages are specifically au-
thorized by the Customer Agreement there would seem to be no basis
for their award to an aggrieved investor.80 It goes without saying that
73. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1021 (6th Cir.
1979); DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55, 56 (S.D. Fla. 1976); Greitzer v. United States
National Bank, 326 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
74. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d at 1021; Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367, 370-72 (7th Cir. 1978); Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Ham-
mill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 23 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
75. See Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982). But
see Greitzer v. United States National Bank, 326 F. Supp. at 764-65 (proper claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress not pleaded, as no "outrageous conduct" was
alleged).
76. The potential for recovery of punitive damages on litigated state law claims is
cited as the "primary reason for pleading state causes of action along with federal securi-
ties claims" by the author in Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute
Arbitration Agreements For Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 693, 709 (1980). Another rea-
son suggested by Krause is the increased liability of a principal for the acts of his or her
agents under state law in some jurisdictions. (The state common law theory of respondeat
superior vs. the federal "controlling person" standard.) Id. at 696-97 nn. 19-20.
77. The damages section of the Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(e), 12(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(e), 771(2) (1982) do not provide for recovery of punitive damages. Punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable under the Exchange Act of 1934 by virtue of § 28(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1982) which provides that no one shall recover "a total amount in excess of his
actual damages."
78. See supra note 8.
79. See, e.g., Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 703 F.2d 1152 (10th
Cir. 1981) (Plaintiffs alleged violations of § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of the '34 Act, § 22(a) of
the '33 Act, a state statute prohibiting wrongful transfer of securities, common law fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. Origi-
nal judgment of $3,000,000 punitive damages reduced on appeal to $1,000,000.), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 92 (1983).
80. Cf Silverberg v. Schwartz, 75 App. Div. 2d 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1980), where a
court reversed an arbitrator's award of punitive damages pursuant to the terms of a part-
nership agreement, holding that punitive damages is a sanction reserved to state and judi-
ciary, and cannot be conferred on an arbitrator by agreement.
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the inclusion of such a remedy in the Customer Agreement is not likely.
More importantly, the validity of each state's securities laws be-
comes questionable, in situations where the investor has signed a Cus-
tomer Agreement with an arbitration clause, and sues his or her broker
alleging violations of state (but no federal) securities laws.
In Kroog v. Mait,8 1 for example, Kroog originally filed her case in
state court, alleging violations of the Wisconsin Uniform Securities Law
and several common law causes of action.8 2 The defendants transferred
the action to federal district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction,
answered the complaint, and moved to stay the proceedings and compel
arbitration, pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the Customer
Agreement. The trial court denied the motion to arbitrate holding that
the anti-waiver provision in the Wisconsin securities laws 83 required liti-
gation of the claims that alleged violations of Wisconsin securities law, a
holding directly analogous to the United States Supreme Court's Wilko
decision.8 4 The trial court viewed the issue as being a conflict between
the Federal Arbitration Act provisions and the entire Wisconsin securi-
ties regulatory scheme. 8 5 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the trial
court's analysis of the conflicting state and federal statutes. It defined
the conflict as between two procedural mandates, the federal law com-
pelling and the state law prohibiting arbitration, rather than as a clash
between federal arbitration procedures and Wisconsin substantive se-
curities regulation. The court found that the federal arbitration scheme
preempted application of the state statute under the Supremacy
Clause. 86 In this situation, the state securities laws provided no protec-
tion to the aggrieved investor.8 7 In other words, Kroog v. Mail appar-
81. 712 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1001 (1984).
82. Kroog's first cause of action alleged that defendant Mait bought and sold securi-
ties in Wisconsin in violation of the State's registration requirements. Her second claim
alleged that the brokerage contract between the parties was void and subject to rescission
because Mait himself was not properly registered. The remaining three causes of action
alleged defendants' liability under the common law theories of mismanagement, unsuita-
ble purchases, excessive trading, and breach of fiduciary duty. 712 F.2d at 1149.
83. Wis. STAT. § 551 59(8) (1972) ("Any condition, stipulation or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter
or any rule or order hereunder is void.").
84. 712 F.2d at 1151.
85. Id.
86. Id. See also Klien Sleep Products, Inc. v. Hillside Bedding Co., 563 F. Supp. 904
(SJD.N.Y. 1982) (non-waiver provision in New York Franchise Sales Act): Barron v. Tastee
Freez International, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1213 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (non-waiver provision under
Wisconsin Uniform Securities Law). Compare Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("The effect of [Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act] is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitra-
tion agreement within the coverage of the Act.") (emphasis added) with Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 865 (1984) (O'Connor, J. and Rehnquist,J. dissenting) (The "his-
tory [of the Federal Arbitration Act] establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress
viewed the FAA as a procedural statute .. ."). See also Southland Corp. v. Keating at 862
(Stevens,J. concurring) (Although the FAA, as enacted, was intended to be a "statute...
essentially procedural in nature,. . . intervening developments in the law" compel agree-
ment with the majority, i.e., that the statute results in a substantive body of law.).
87. 712 F.2d at 1149. Cf Kiehne v. Purdy, 309 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1981) (In an action
alleging fraud, breach of contract and violations of the Minnesota Blue Sky law, the Minne-
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ently stands for the proposition that the Federal Arbitration Act
overrides any conflicting anti-waiver provision contained in state securi-
ties laws. In cases that may be removed to a federal court, the presence
of a valid arbitration agreement effectively deprives an investor of the
protection of his or her state's securities regulations; state law claims
must be arbitrated in these circumstances.
In an analogous factual situation, the California Supreme Court
ruled in Southland Corp. v. Keating"s that the California Franchise Invest-
ment Law, which contains a anti-waiver provision similar to those con-
tained in the Federal Securities Acts8 9 and many state securities laws9 °
required judicial consideration of claims based on the Franchise Law.
The court concluded that the California statute did not contravene the
Federal Arbitration Act. 9 1 This decision was overturned by the United
States Supreme Court, 92 which held that the California court's interpre-
tation "directly conflicts with section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
and violates the Supremacy Clause."' 93 The state statute reviewed in
Southland Corp. v. Keating is so similar to the non-waiver provisions in
many state and the Federal Securities Acts that there seems little doubt
that the Southland holding would be directly applicable, although the dis-
sent preserved the procedural/substantive distinction9 4 originally raised
by the trial court in Kroog v. Mait.9 5 The trend begun by Kroog,9 6 and
ratified indirectly in Southland,97 and directly in Byrd98 is now undenia-
ble. The recently decided case of Sager v. District Court99 is illustrative.
The Colorado Supreme Court "reluctantly" overruled its previous hold-
ing, based on Wilko, 00 that common law claims intertwined with alleged
state securities law violations need not be arbitrated. Although the Col-
orado Securities Act1 0 1 contains a provision that is nearly identical to
the anti-waiver provision in the Federal Securities Acts, the Colorado
court acknowledged that:
Wilko is not applicable since it dealt with Congress' power to
override one federal statute with another. Here we are dealing
with the state's power to enact a statute which overrides a fed-
sota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the arbitration agreement was
void under state law.).
88. 31 Cal. 3d 584, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 645 P.2d 1192 (1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 852
(1984).
89. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see infra note 101 and accompanying text.
91. 31 Cal. 3d at 604, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72, 645 P.2d at 1203-04.
92. 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
93. Id. at 858.
94. Id. at 864-70, (O'Connor, J. and Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
95. 712 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1001 (1984).
96. 712 F.2d 1148, 1153-54.
97. 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
98. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
99. 698 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1985).
100. Id. at 255.
101. Colo. Securities Act of 1981, CoLO. REv. STAT. § 11-51-125(10) (1973) provides:
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of this article or any rule or order under this artide is
void."
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eral statute .... The Arbitration Act is part of the federal sub-
stantive law, and, thus, under the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
Const. art. VI, Cl. 2, any conflicting state statute is void.
10 2
When a valid arbitration clause exists, it now appears inescapable
that the state's securities laws are a dead letter.
B. An Adhesion Contract
One of the defenses commonly raised by plaintiff/investors at-
tempting to resist arbitration is that the arbitration clause is not valid
because it is contained in a standardized form not subject to negotia-
tions or change. Byrd presented this argument, but not until the case
reached the Supreme Court, which "declined to address it in the first
instance . . .express[ing] no view on the merits of the argument."'
0 3
Wilko fared little better; although one of the two reasons 104 given for not
enforcing the arbitration clause in Wilko v. Swan was the inequality of
bargaining power between the parties, the possibility that the Customer
Agreement was an adhesion contract was raised briefly, by the dissent,
only to be summarily dismissed.'
0 5
The typical adhesion contract is a standard form contract drafted by
a party with strong bargaining power and offered to a party whose bar-
gaining power is much weaker.' 0 6 The fact that the contract is a stan-
dard, pre-printed form prepared by one of the parties is not
determinative.' 0 7 Because one of the requirements for a valid arbitra-
tion agreement is that it reflects a voluntary decision not to litigate, its
102. 698 P.2d at 254. See also Garmo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 101 Wash. 2d 585,
681 P.2d 253 (1984). Contra Oppenheimer & Co. v. Young, 456 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1984),
(state securities non-waiver provision not applicable due to the Supremacy Clause) vacated,
105 S. Ct. 1830 (1985).
103. 105 S. Ct. at 1240 n.2.
104. The second reason for the Court's decision was that judicial direction was neces-
sary in order to ensure correct application of the Act. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 435-37.
See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. Cf Sterk, supra note 21, at 517; Gruenbaum,
supra note 4, at 62, quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 417 U.S. 506, 521 (1974) (Doug-
las J., dissenting) (disparity in bargaining power not a valid reason for denying
arbitration).
105. 346 U.S. at 440 (Frankfurter, J. and Minton, J. dissenting). The only court directly
addressing the contention that the Customer Agreement was an adhesive contract held
that it was not, and thus the arbitration clause was valid and enforceable as to non-federal
claims. See Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147
(1975); see also Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59 at 61
n.2 ("There is certainly nothing inherently unfair about arbitration clauses, and they are
therefore valid and enforceable."); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F.
Supp. at 579 n.2 ("My disposition of this matter on other grounds obviates the necessity of
reaching [the issue of whether the] printed options agreement is a contract of adhe-
sion .. "); cf. Hope v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 122 Cal. App. 3d 147, 175
Cal. Rptr. 851 (1981) (NYSE arbitration procedures "one-sided" such that broker-em-
ployee contract unenforceable), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 (1982).
106. Wright, Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 33 ARB. J. 41, 41 (1978).
107. Id. at 43 (citation omitted). See also Weinrott v. Carp, 32 N.Y.2d 190, 298 N.E.2d
42, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973) where the court said of arbitration clauses: "[W]here a form
contract is involved ... a court should give the provision and the circumstances sur-
rounding its inclusion great scrutiny." The court did not, however, indicate that arbitra-
tion clauses in form contracts or contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power
would automatically be invalid. See geneTrally M. DOMKE, supra note 11, at 41-44.
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use is inimical in an adhesion contract, where the party with the weaker
bargaining power "accepts" the contract, either because the stronger
party is the only provider of the desired goods or services, or because all
other parties providing the same goods or services use an identical
contract. 108
The arbitration clause that the investor agreed to in the past was
contained in the brokerage firm's Customer Agreement' 0 9 which the in-
vestor executed when opening a stock, option, or commodity account.
Generally, the arbitration clause varied little from firm to firm. The in-
vestor routinely agreed that "[a]ny controversy between us or arising
out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be set-
tled by arbitration.... .110 The Securities and Exchange Commission
recently adopted Rule 15c2-2111 prohibiting broker-dealers from using
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in customer agreements that purport to
bind public 12 customers to arbitrate all claims relating to the contract,
including those arising under the federal securities laws. The SEC
noted that the arbitration clause formerly contained in the standard cus-
tomer agreement was "a misleading statement of the customer's rights
under the federal securities laws .. .in light of clearly contrary law in
this area,""l 3 i.e., the Wilko decision. As originally proposed, the new
rule would have required the standard arbitration clause to be supple-
mented by a disclosure advising the customer of his or her right to liti-
gate any federal securities claims. As enacted, however, the rule states
that "[i]t shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or prac-
tice 14 for a broker or dealer to enter into an agreement with any public
customer which purports to bind the customer to the arbitration of fu-
108. Wright, supra note 106, at 41.
109. As used in this article, "Customer Agreement" is a generic term describing the
agreement, set out on a pre-printed form provided by the brokerage firm, which delineates
the rights and obligations of each party regarding the particular type of account the inves-
tor has opened.
110. 550 F. Supp. at 579 n.1 (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.). See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. at 432 n.15; Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59, 60
n.1 (8th Cir. 1984); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 314, 315 n.l & 2 (6th Cir.
1983); Kroog v. Mait, 712 F.2d 1148, 1150 (7th Cir. 1983); Sawyer v. Raymond, James &
Associates, 642 F.2d 791, 792 (5th Cir. 1981); Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176,
1178-79 n.2 (2nd Cir. 1974); Ging v. Parker-Hunter Inc., 544 F. Supp. 49, 54 (W.D. Pa.
1982); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Vernon v.
Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 149 n.2 (1975).
111. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1984).
112. The Wilko doctrine, providing that investors are not bound by waivers of their
right to judicial resolution of federal securities claims, does not apply to self-regulatory
organizations. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3), (a)(24) (1982).
This section was amended by § 21 (1) of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982). The principal effect of the
amendment was to expand the provision to include members of and participants in the
self-regulatory organizations. See generally Gruenbaum, supra note 4, at 69, 70.
113. SEC Release No. 34-20397, File No. 57-976. As a further justification for the
adoption of this rule, mandating a prominently placed disclosure of the effects of arbitra-
tion, and the customer's right to litigate the federal securities claims, the SEC noted that
"years of informal discussions have failed to correct" the text of the standard misleading
arbitration clause. Id.
114. In other words, violations of §§ 10(b), 15(c) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c).
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ture disputes between them arising under the federal securities
laws. . "1 15
The possibility exists that pursuant to section 29(b) of the 1934
Act, 1 6 any Customer Agreement not containing the supplemental dis-
closure required by Rule 15c2-2 "shall be void." Section 29(b) excepts
contracts involving violations of rules or regulations promulgated under
paragraphs (2) or (3) of subsection (c) of section 15 from the invalidity
imposed by section 29. However, an investor may be able to present a
convincing argument that this exception does not apply to Customer
Agreements not including the arbitration disclosure, because Rule 15c2-
2 was promulgated under the joint authority of sections 10(b) and
15(c). 1 17 In other words, in order to be able to force an investor to
arbitrate state and common law claims against it, a brokerage firm's Cus-
tomer Agreement must contain the Rule 15c2-2 disclosure clarifying
that federal securities claims may not be arbitrated.
C. The Arbitral Process
At present, none of the Securities Acts specify arbitration as a
method of customer dispute resolution, and one commentator is of the
opinion that an amendment of these acts may be necessary in order to
completely resolve the conflict between the Securities Acts and the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act. 1 8 In the interim, the Securities Industry Confer-
ence on Arbitration was formed in 1977 to draft and propose uniform
arbitration rules for self-regulators such as the securities exchanges and
the National Association of Securities Dealers. Uniform rules for small
claims of less than $2500 were adopted in 1978 by the New York Stock
Exchange and the NASD with SEC approval. 1 19
Although the arbitral process is quicker and less expensive 120 than
115. 17 C.F.R. 240.15c2-2(a) (1984).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982), in pertinent part provides:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this title or any rule or regu-
lation thereunder, and every contract. . . heretofore or hereafter made the per-
formance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any
relationship or practice in violation of, any provision of this title or any rule or
regulation thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who,
in violation of any such provision, rule or regulation, shall have made or engaged
in the performance of any such contract. . .Provided, (A) that no contract shall be
void by reason of this subsection because of any violation of any rule or regula-
tion prescribed pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (c) of section 15 of
this title . ..
117. S- also Stansbury & Klein, suppra note 35 at 38.
118. See 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP., No. 10 (BNA 1984), where SEC General Counsel
Daniel Goelzer was quoted as saying that the SEC "should consider the feasibility of legis-
lation to reverse Wilko v. Swan" substituting instead an industry regulated arbitration sys-
tem. Id. at 470 (from a speech given to the Securities Industry Association Legal &
Compliance Committee, in New York City, on Jan. 17, 1984).
119. See, e.g., NASD Securities Dealers Manual, paragraph 3701, Code of Arbitration
Procedure, paragraph 3712-3744, Part III, Uniform Code of Arbitration, Section 12; New
York Stock Exchange Guide, Vol. 2, paragraph 2600-2630, Arbitration, Rules 600-630.
120. Anderson, Arbitration and the Law; "A Better Way," 30 LAB. L.J. 259 (1979). But Cf.
Vaglahn, Arbitration Costs/Time: Labor and Management Views, 30 LAB. L.J. 49 (1979).
Vaglahn suggests that the time and cost required to arbitrate have been increasing,
although he does not compare these increases to a standard court proceeding.
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litigation, and is a method of dispute resolution commonly used in many
other areas,' 2 ' several questions remain concerning its suitability for
resolution of securities claims. One problem presented by arbitration is
the perception that an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators composed of
members of the securities industry will give the investors' complaints
short shrift.' 2 2 The existence of the intertwining doctrine cases is itself
evidence that investors continue to distrust and strenously resist at-
tempts to arbitrate their state securities and common law claims, despite
the increased expense and protracted delays associated with litiga-
tion.12 3 The absence of published arbitration decisions also makes it
very difficult for an investor to evaluate the behavior and fairness
124
with which his or her claim is likely to be treated.
While the Uniform Arbitration code presently provides that a ma-
jority of arbitrators selected to hear customer-broker disputes will not
be affiliated with the securities industry,' 2 5 another question is raised;
one of the justifications for arbitration is that certain claims, because of
their complexity, should be referred to arbitrators who are more knowl-
edgable about the securities industry than judges sitting in courts of
general jurisdiction. 126 When arbitrators from outside the industry are
selected, the validity of this justification is severely eroded.
D. Collateral Estoppel
One of the primary justifications given by the courts that had
adopted the intertwining doctrine was the view that arbitration is "a
threat . . . posed to the [court's] exclusive federal jurisdiction."'12 7 In
Miley v. Oppenheimer,128 the investor sued her broker and two of its regis-
121. See generally 5 AMJUR. 2d Arbitration and Award § 54-60 (1962).
122. Pursuant to provision of a uniform arbitration code adopted by the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers and New York Stock Exchange, the majority of arbitrators
selected to hear customer/broker disputes are not to be affiliated with the securities indus-
try. In addition, the parties have a right to preemptory challenge of arbitrators, as well as a
challenge for cause. The arbitration director of the sponsoring organization is empowered
to disqualify arbitrators before the hearing commences, and must disclose to the parties
any circumstances revealed by an arbitrator concerning that arbitrator's ability to render a
fair and impartial decision.
123. See, e.g., Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972). In Sobel, the
investor had charged the brokerage firm and two of its registered representatives with
market manipulation, unauthorized trading, and fraudulent misrepresentations in connec-
tion with activities in his accounts. The registered representatives were subsequently in-
dicted (United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The investor elected to
arbitrate his claims, signing an agreement to that effect. The claim went to exchange arbi-
tration where it was denied in an award without decision or reasoning. After the arbitra-
tion, the registered representatives were convicted of conspiracy and market manipulation.
Sobel involved an attempt to overturn the arbitrator's award on grounds that it violated
public policy and was "in manifest disregard" of the securities laws; although the investor
prevailed in the district court, the Second Circuit reversed. See also S. BRODSKY, GUIDE TO
SECURITIES LrrIGATION 293-312 (1974) for an extensive discussion of Sobel.
124. See Note, Arbitration of Investor-Broker-Disputes, supra note 4, at 129 n.59.
125. See Stansbury & Klein, supra note 35, at 38.
126. See Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d at 646; Stansbury & Klein, supra
note 35, at 32.
127. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. 637 F.2d 318, 336 (5th Cir. 1981).
128. 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
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tered representatives, seeking recovery under federal securities laws,
Texas common law and Texas statutes for the alleged "churning"'
129 of
her account. After the district court entered judgment for the plaintiff
on the breach of fiduciary duty count, awarding both actual and punitive
damages, the defendant appealed, arguing that the district court had
erred in refusing to order arbitration of the state law claims. In a section
of the opinion entitled "Refusal to Order Arbitration: Preserving Ho-
mogenized Milk," the court of appeals noted that
when the same factual (and legal) conclusions must be drawn
from the common evidentiary facts in order to resolve the fed-
eral and pendent state claims - when the same 'ultimate facts'
underlie each claim - a threat is posed to the exclusive federal
jurisdiction. A federal forum is charged with the sole responsi-
bility and is correlatively granted the sole right to decide the
ultimate issues essential to a federal securities claim, based on
its own appraisal of the evidence. Allowing an arbitrator to
make the primary appraisal of the evidence and reach the pri-
mary conclusions on the issues central to the resolution of the
case presents a threat of binding the federal forum through col-
lateral estoppel, and, at the very least, forces the federal court
to reach its findings in light of prior conclusions on the very
same issues. 
1 3 0
The court concluded that when a violation of the federal securities
laws is found, subsequent arbitration of the state claims "makes no
sense." Because the plaintiff has suffered but one legal wrong, a judg-
ment can be entered only once, even though several alternate routes of
recovery are proposed. Thus, the investor "could be forced to endure a
long and protracted arbitration procedure"' 3 1 before his court judg-
ment could be realized. In many cases, the plaintiff would choose not to
pursue his state claims, in order to more quickly collect the federal judg-
ment in his favor, "thereby effectively undercutting the very purpose of
pendent jurisdiction." 1
3 2
129. "Churning occurs when a securities broker enters into transactions and manages a
client's account for the purpose of generating commissions and in disregard of [the] cli-
ent's interests." Id. at 324 [citations omitted]. To successfully prove that his or her ac-
count has been churned, an investor must prove that: "(1) the trading in his account was
excessive in light of his investment objectives; (2) the broker in question exercised control
over the trading in the account; and (3) the broker acted with the intent to defraud or with
willful and reckless disregard for the investor's interests .. " Id If proven, the broker
may be held liable for violations of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Id. (citations omitted).
(Churning is classified as a "device, scheme or artifice to defraud," language used to define
a type of Rule lOb-5 violation.) In addition, the investor will, in most if not all cases, also
be entitled to hold the broker liable for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. and n.4.
130. Id. at 335-36.
131. Id. at 336.
132. Id. at 337. This very point is raised, and expanded on in Cunningham v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. at 584:
By raising the spectre of bifurcated proceedings, the Dickinson solution also cre-
ates an incentive for plaintiffs to try one set of claims in order to obtain speedier
justice. The [Dickinson] court's analysis has assumed that plaintiffs typically drop
neither set but continue with the bifurcated proceedings. In reality, some plain-
tiffs can be expected to drop their pendent common law claims, and to proceed
only with the federal action in order to speed collection. As Judge Goldberg
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In jurisdictions which did not recognize the intertwining doctrine,
the perceived "threat" of collateral estoppel was eliminated by severing
the arbitrable federal securities claims from the non-arbitrable state and
common law claims, and then staying the arbitration of the state and
common law claims pending litigation of the federal action.13 3 This was
the procedure followed by the court in Stockwell v. Reynolds Co. 134 and
appeared to be a "commendable compromise because it preserves the
parties' contractual right to arbitration, while recognizing that the fed-
eral securities laws claims form the gravamen of the action, the state law
claims are generally pendent in a very real sense."
13 5
The Byrd Court summarily disposed of this "threat" by noting that
the basic premise that an arbitration award must be accorded preclusive
treatment by a federal court was a "misconception." 1 36 Citing a case
decided the previous Term, McDonald v. City of West Branch,'3 7 the Court
stated that:
The full faith and credit statute [28 U.S.C. § 1738] requires
that federal courts give the same preclusive effect to a State's
judicial proceedings as would the courts of the State rendering the
judgment, and since arbitration is not a judicial proceeding, we
held that the statute does not apply to arbitration awards. The
same analysis inevitably would apply to any unappealed state
arbitration proceeding. 1
38
The McDonald decision also refrained from fashioning a federal com-
mon-law rule of preclusion, leaving the lower courts to "directly and
effectively protect federal interests by [themselves] determining the
preclusive effect to be given to an arbitration proceeding. . . In fram-
ing preclusion rules in this context, courts shall take into account the
federal interests warranting protection."'
3 9
pointed out in Miley, this violates the policy of pendent jurisdiction. It is also
conceivable that some plaintiffs would drop their federal cause of action, hoping
for faster and cheaper results through arbitration. This would defeat the purpose
of exclusive federal jurisdiction for cases arising under the federal securities laws.
(citations omitted)
Id. at 584 n.7.
133. See Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
134. Id. In a somewhat analogous situation, it was suggested that a court could decide
not to give collateral estoppel effect to an arbitrator's findings of fact in subsequent litiga-
tion of an intertwined antitrust claim. See University Life Ins. Co. of America v. Unimarc
Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1983); accord, Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1243-44. This would
seem, however, to constitute defacto review of the arbitrator's findings, which is not per-
mitted by the Arbitration Act except in very unusual circumstances. See supra notes 18-19
and accompanying text. If the investor should voluntarily proceed with arbitration, how-
ever, the arbitrator's decision is final, and res judicata will prevent a subsequent court
determination (absent the circumstances outlined supra notes 18-19). See Blumberg v. Ber-
land, 678 F.2d 1068 (11th Cir. 1982).
135. Note, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, supra note 19, at 146.
136. 105 S. Ct. at 1243.
137. 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
138. 105 S. Ct. at 1243 (citing 104 S. Ct. 1799, at 1802).
139. 105 S. Ct. at 1243-44. Compare the "federal interests warranting protection," id.,
with the Wilko rationale prohibiting arbitration of federal securities claims. "The protec-
tive provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly as-
sure their effectiveness..." 346 U.S. at 439. This would seem to indicate that no effect
be given to the arbitrator's decision.
INTERTWINING DOCTRINE
E. Duplication and Inefficiency
The second justification cited by courts that had utilized the inter-
twining doctrine was that litigation of federal claims and arbitration of
state or common law claims based on the same facts and circumstances
was duplicative and inefficient.
140
Although Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd presented the Court with
a case of first impression regarding the intertwining of federal securities
claims with state and common law claims, recent Supreme Court cases
dealing with related situations clearly laid the groundwork for the rejec-
tion of the intertwining doctrine. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp. ,141 a dispute over payment for increased costs
arose between a contractor and its employer or hospital. The contractor
filed an action in state court against the hospital seeking a declaratory
judgment that there was no right to arbitration. 142 The hospital subse-
quently filed an action in federal district court based on diversity juris-
diction seeking an order compelling arbitration. 143 The federal court
stayed its action pending resolution of the state court suit because both
suits involved the identical issue of the arbitrability of the hospital's
claims. 144 The trial court's stay of the federal action pending a decision
by the state court regarding arbitration was appealed; the court of ap-
peals reversed and remanded with instructions to enter an order to arbi-
trate and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The hospital sought to prevent arbitration of the dispute because it
believed that it was caught in the middle. If it was found to owe the
contractor delay and impact costs, it would seek indemnity from the ar-
chitect. The dispute with the contractor was subject to a valid arbitra-
tion agreement, but there was no such agreement between the hospital
and the architect. One court's decision to compel arbitration meant that
the hospital would "be forced to resolve these related disputes in differ-
ent forums."' 14 5 The Court went on to note that:
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation
140. Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
However, courts which have recognized the intertwining doctrine would apply it only
'when it is impractical if not impossible to separate out non-arbitrable federal securities
law claims from arbitrable contract claims. A court should deny arbitration in order to
preserve its exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities act claims." Sibley v. Tandy
Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977) (citations omitted).
By way of illustration, the court stated in a footnote that "[i]f an arbitrator were to resolve
plaintiff's Texas securities law and common law fraud complaints, he would be dealing
with the same facts which form the basis for plaintiff's claim of federal securities law viola-
tions. Therefore, we hold that plaintiff's claims under Texas securities law, like his claims
under the federal securities laws, are not arbitrable." Id. at 543 n.3.
141. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
142. Id. at 7.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 20.
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of waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability.' 46
The support cited by the Court for this statement includes Dickinson v.
Heinold Securities, Inc., 14 7 the leading Seventh Circuit case repudiating
the intertwining doctrine. The Byrd Court echos these sentiments, again
citing Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc.,148 stating "even where the result
would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in
different forums. . . courts [must] compel arbitration of arbitrable
claims, when asked to do so.'
149
CONCLUSION
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd presented a conflict between the
policies underlying the Arbitration Act, 150 and the desire to avoid dupli-
cative and inefficient splitting of factually related causes of action
through the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.' 5 ' Two other concerns-
that the contract containing the arbitration clause is not subject to nego-
tiation, and is possibly an adhesive contract 152 and the previous partial-
ity problems of industry-affiliated ar'bitrators'53-appear to have been
satisfactorily addressed by the securities industry. A third potential
problem, the possibility that a federal court might be stripped of its ex-
clusive jurisdiction to hear federal securities claims, was explained away
by the Byrd Court as a "misconception"' t 4 and not a problem at all.
The last uncertainty and one which the Court cannot resolve is the prac-
tical effect that the Byrd decision, which requires litigation of federal
claims and arbitration of related claims, will have on an investor. Will
this bifurcation be "so coercive that it [will] force plaintiffs to abandon
their statutorily protected right to have judicial resolution of their secur-
ities claims"? 155 Or will it "create an incentive" for plaintiffs to "drop
their pendent. . . claims, and to proceed only with the federal action in
order to speed collection"?' 56 And finally, although the potential loss
of punitive damage awards raises a serious problem, 15 7 a much more
ominous threat to the continued vitality of the state securities laws is
presented. 158 It would therefore seem that the uprooting of the inter-
twining doctrine has sown the seeds of questions that will remain with us
for some time.
Lynn Hahn
146. Id. at 24-25.
147. Id. at 25 n.31.
148. 105 S. Ct. at 1241.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
151. 383 U.S. at 726.
152. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
154. 105 S. Ct. at 1243.
155. 661 F.2d at 644 n.13.
156. 550 F. Supp. at 584 n.7.
157. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 81-102 and accompanying text.
